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Abstract
We study whether Google search behavior for “mortgage assistance” and
“foreclosure help” aggregated in the mortgage default risk indicator (MDRI)
of Chauvet et al. (2016) helps predict future house prices and foreclosures in
local residential markets. Using a long-run equilibrium model, we disaggregate
house prices into their fundamental and bubble components, and we find that
MDRI dampens both components of house prices. This negative relationship is
robust to various model specifications and time horizons. A higher intensity of
search online, however, is associated with lower future foreclosure rates. We
also find that foreclosure rates increase after a decline in the fundamental
component of home values, but are not sensitive to their transitory (bubble)
component. Foreclosure rates are higher in metropolitan areas located in non-
recourse states. We interpret these findings as evidence for strategic household
behavior. Our paper sheds new light on the predictive power of household
sentiment derived from Google searches on prices and foreclosure rates in local
housing markets.
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Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis serves as a powerful reminder of the seismic impact that
the financial behavior of homeowners can exert on the U.S. financial system and
economy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, a voluminous literature has developed
that aims to shed light on a key relationship in the run-up to the crisis: the interdepen-
dence between downward spiraling house prices and rising mortgage default rates. A
better grasp of this issue was a matter of urgency during the housing market downturn
as policymakers evaluated initiatives to curb the wave of foreclosures and help
‘underwater’ homeowners to stay in their homes (Calomiris et al. 2013; Foote et al.
2008). Yet, the topic remains high on the public policy agenda as it lays bare the
tension between housing affordability and financial stability, and carries implications
for mortgage market design and macro-prudential regulation.
In the post-crisis period, there has also been substantial interest in the development
of mortgage default risk indicators which can serve as a “warning signal” for ensuing
future turmoil in housing and mortgage markets. The construction of such forward-
looking sentiment indices from household survey data (such as the consumer sentiment
survey of the University of Michigan) however has proven elusive. Household surveys
are constrained with respect to geographical coverage and number of participants. Their
reliability is further complicated by the reluctance of respondents to truthfully answer
sensitive questions particularly related to their financial affairs (Singer and Ye 2013),
and hence they are of limited use as a predictive tool particularly in the context of
housing and mortgage markets.
A viable alternative that has increasingly been pursued in recent research is the
creation of sentiment indices from internet search queries. Da et al. (2011, 2015)
develop an investor sentiment indicator for the stock market while Beracha and
Wintoki (2013) and Van Dijk and Francke (2018) create a proxy for housing
demand and show that online behavior has predictive power for house prices and
liquidity in local residential markets. More recently, Chauvet et al. (2016) construct a
mortgage default risk index (MDRI) based on the intensity of online searches for
keywords such as “mortgage help” and “foreclosure assistance” captured by Google
Trends. They show that this broad-based index predicts house price returns, returns on
subprime credit default swaps and other relevant mortgage indicators, and conclude that
MDRI “acts as a leading indicator of the most up-to-date, real-time measures of
housing market performance.”
Despite the advantages of MDRI as a predictive tool relative to survey-based
alternatives, little is known about the identity, reasons, or intentions of the households
whose online searches are aggregated in the index. As Chauvet et al. (2016) point out,
“searches are derived from all households, a universe that includes both owners and
renters,” yet, it may be assumed that “the bulk of such searches likely emanate from
property owners as they are most likely to be concerned with mortgage default.”
While this assumption seems plausible, it is unknown how households process the
information they gather in their online searches. One possibility, suggested by Chauvet
et al. (2016) is that MDRI captures “household concerns about mortgage failure or
foreclosure.” Another plausible alternative is that households learn by searching for
relevant terms online and condition their behavior on the information they gathered.
That is, as a result of the information they collect online, households may adapt their
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behavior when dealing with financial distress, learning how to take advantage of
government programs, or interacting with their mortgage lenders. Tetlock (2007) for
example, hypothesizes a similar bi-directional relationship when studying the effect of
negative media coverage on investor sentiment: While news printed in the Wall Street
Journal might convey investor attitudes toward stocks not yet impounded in asset
prices, they might also directly shape investors’ perception of stocks.1 Similarly, online
searches might divulge information and at the same time convey information to
economic agents who then act on this information. Indeed, top results from online
searches include information on government programs to avert foreclosure as well as
legal information. The mechanism of information acquisition by online searchers,
however, is likely different from the one discussed by Tetlock (2007). While
investor reaction to media content described by Tetlock is consistent with noise
trader theories implying irrational behavior, the information gathering by house-
holds via online searches could be rational. Online searches can help house-
holds chart an optimal plan of action given the legal and institutional frame-
work available in the state in which they reside as well as provide guidance on
how to take advantage of government assistance programs.
A third possible scenario is that some searches are originating from prospective
home buyers or home sellers who are trying to time their transactions or from investors
trying to form expectations about the future performance of mortgage-related assets.
Online searches thus might reflect the expectations about future market trends of this
group of agents.
From a theoretical perspective, these three hypotheses are consistent with different causal
relationships. The first hypothesis would predict an increase in foreclosures while the
second hypothesis would predict a decrease in foreclosures as a result of a surge in the
MDRI. The third hypothesis would imply no relationship between MDRI and foreclosures
but a negative relationship between MDRI and future house prices as agents reveal their
negative expectations about future market trends when searching online. Currently little is
known about which of these hypotheses applies to local housing markets as most of the
analysis by Chauvet et al. (2016) is conducted at the national level (local level analysis is
restricted in terms of geographical coverage and does not account for metropolitan-area
specific demographic and economic conditions).
The main objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between MDRI and
future house prices and foreclosure rates in local housing markets. We advance
previous research by expanding the set of metropolitan areas and accounting for the
differences in appreciation rates between house price segments within the same
geographical area. Furthermore, we take into account local economic conditions as
well as relevant aspects related to mortgage lending at the regional level. Using a large
set of metropolitan-area specific fundamental factors, we estimate a long-run equilib-
rium model and disaggregate house prices into their fundamental (equilibrium) com-
ponent and bubble (deviation from equilibrium) component. We then study the rela-
tionship between MDRI and future house prices as well as their fundamental
and bubble components. Further, we use this house price disaggregation to
provide a more detailed analysis of the impact of the fundamental and bubble
components on foreclosures.
1 Tetlock (2007) finds evidence for the latter causal direction but not for the former one.
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Related Literature
This paper contributes to two distinct strands of literature. The first strand examines the
predictive power of online search intensity on real economic activity. Almost a decade
ago, Hal Varian (Google’s Chief Economist) suggested that Google Trends data on the
search volume for specific keywords helps predict information contained in future
government data releases.2 Since then academics have explored the predictive power of
Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI) in other domains such as business activity and
financial markets. Da et al. (2011, 2015) show that SVI captures investor attention and
predicts stock prices at 2-week horizons. Beracha and Wintoki (2013) show that search
intensity for terms such as “real estate” and “rent” help predict home prices. Chauvet
et al. (2016) construct a mortgage default risk index from the search intensity of SVI for
terms such as “mortgage assistance” and “foreclosure help,” and show that this index
helps predict housing return, mortgage delinquency indicators, and subprime credit
default swaps. In this paper, we examine the predictive power of this index for city-
level housing appreciation rates in different market segments while taking into account
local fundamental factors, mortgage market conditions, and mortgage market legisla-
tion in the states in which metropolitan areas are located (i.e. whether mortgage
contracts are recourse or non-recourse). In recourse states, lenders can pursue bor-
rowers for the mortgage balance remaining after foreclosed properties are sold while in
non-recourse states they cannot.
The second strand of literature, which developed rapidly in the aftermath of the
subprime mortgage crisis, explores the impact of house prices on foreclosure rates.
Studies on the contributing role of price declines to mortgage defaults examine the extent
to which household behavior conforms to the “option-theoretical” model of mortgage
default. A key prediction of this theory is that households find it optimal to walk away
from their investment as soon as their equity falls below a certain (negative) threshold
(Foster and Van Order 1984; Kau et al. 1994). Closely related research on the ‘double
trigger’ hypothesis has developed which aims to disentangle the contributing role of the
strategic motive from that of affordability issues and cash flow problems of households
(e.g. income shock related to job loss, divorce, or unforeseen healthcare expenses).
Empirical studies conducted before the financial crisis find that negative equity is indeed
a significant determinant of default (see e.g., Deng et al. 2000; Bajari et al. 2008; and
Foote et al. 2008). Using the data from the financial crisis, Elul et al. (2010) present the
estimates for the contributions of negative equity, illiquidity (measured by credit card
utilization), unemployment shocks and the existence of a second mortgage to the
probability of default. More recently, Kelly and McCann (2016) find that short-term
arrears are primarily driven by unemployment, negative income shocks or divorce, while
long-term arrears are much more likely to be due to negative equity. Using post-crisis
data, Mocetti and Viviano (2017) identify job losses as a primary reason for mortgage
delinquencies. Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) find that borrowers are 30% more likely to
default in non-recourse states, whereby this effect is much stronger for homeowners of
high-value homes. Moreover, Guiso et al. (2013) use survey data to demonstrate that the
willingness to default increases in the home-equity shortfall. Further, the exposure to
2 Choi and Varian (2012) provide evidence that Google Trends data help predict “turning points” in home
sales, automotive sales, and international travel.
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people who recently defaulted for strategic reasons increases default probabilities because
it shows that lenders are unlikely to pursue a deficiency judgment against borrowers.
The interdependence between foreclosures and house prices has also received
considerable attention in the literature. Lin et al. (2009) explore how the distance to a
foreclosed property in space and time impacts home values by focusing on the role of
comparables in the price formation process. LaCour-Little et al. (2020) argue that the
value of comparables need to be adjusted for loan assumability, particularly in areas
with a higher concentration of Federal Housing Administration insured loans.
Calomiris et al. (2013) provide evidence that foreclosures dampen house prices, yet
the negative impact of prices on foreclosures is much greater, in line with the theory of
strategic borrower behavior. In contrast, Bhutta et al. (2017) find that emotional and
behavioral factors are more important in the decision-making process of households
than option-theoretic considerations. Gerardi et al. (2018) use data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to assess the relative importance of negative equity
versus ability to pay. While they find that strategic effects are important, changes in the
ability to pay (e.g., job losses) have large estimated effects.
In this paper, we add to these studies by disaggregating house prices into their
fundamental and bubble components and differentiating between recourse and non-
recourse states. Consistent with strategic motives for default, we find that homes are
foreclosed at higher rates in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) located in non-
recourse states. Furthermore, foreclosures increase when fundamental home values
decline but are not sensitive to transitory deviations from equilibrium (bubble compo-
nent of house prices).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In “Methodology” section, we
present the methodology and in “Data, Variable Construction, and Summary Statistics”
section we describe the data. The empirical results are presented in “Results” section,
and the concluding remarks in “Conclusion” section.
Methodology
We begin our analysis by estimating a fundamental house price model. We assume that
house prices converge toward their equilibrium values in the long run, yet may exhibit
deviations from equilibrium in the short run. Furthermore, as different segments of the
housing market (i.e. starter homes and trade-up homes) might react differently to
changes in fundamentals, we allow for different functional relationships between
fundamentals and Top tier and Bottom tier house prices. That is, the relationships
between Top and Bottom house price tiers and fundamentals are given by the functions
Pj*i;t ¼ f j X i;t
  ð1Þ
where Pj*i;t is the logarithm of the fundamental value of the house in tier j ∈ {T, B} (Top
and Bottom) in MSA i, in month t and Xi, t is the vector of fundamental variables.
Following Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Capozza et al. (2004), we consider
population, income, employment rate, user cost, and construction cost of housing in the
MSA as fundamental factors. Further, because house prices are also affected by
regional geographical and regulatory constraints, we add the land supply elasticity
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estimates derived by Saiz (2010) as a fundamental factor.3 These supply elasticity
indices vary across MSAs but not across time.
The objective of the fundamental model is to estimate the relationships fj(∙) yet a key
concern with the estimation is that the levels of the house price indices and (some of)
the fundamental factors might be non-stationary. A standard approach to address this
issue is the estimation of an error correction framework, and the literature has proposed
various specifications for the long-run relationship between house prices and funda-
mentals as well as the short-run dynamics of house prices (see, e.g. Drake 1993,
Ashworth and Parker 1997, Kasparova and White 2001, and Stevenson 2008). In this
paper, we estimate versions of the error correction mechanism proposed by Abraham
and Hendershott (1996). This estimation method accounts for the serial correlation and
the mean reversion in the time series of US housing returns that are widely documented
in the literature (see, e.g. Case and Shiller 1989, 1990).
We denote the actual appreciation rates of house prices (i.e. continuously
compounded returns) of the two house tiers by ΔP ji;t ¼ P ji;t−Pji;t−1; and the appreciation
rates of the fundamental house prices to be estimated by ΔP j*i;t . Further, we assume that
the way prices respond to fundamental factors is given by a linear relationship
ΔP ji;t ¼ α j0 þ α j1ΔX i;t þ θ ji;t ð2Þ
Hereby α j0 þ α j1ΔX i;t is the change in the fundamental value, which we denote by Pj*i;t ,
and θ ji;t denotes the “error term” which accounts both for momentum and mean
reversion effects and is given by the equation
θ ji;t ¼ λ j0 þ λ j1ΔPji;t−1 þ λ j2 P j*i;t−1−Pji;t−1
 
þ ε ji;t ð3Þ
In this equation, the coefficient λ j1 measures the momentum (serial correlation) while
the coefficient λ j2 measures the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.
Combining eqs. (2) and (3) we obtain:
ΔPji;t ¼ γ j0 þ α j1ΔX i;t þ λ j1ΔP ji;t−1 þ λ j2 Pj*i;t−1−P ji;t−1
 
þ ε ji;t ð4:OLSÞ
where γ j0 ¼ α j0 þ λ j0. In addition to an OLS specification, we estimate fixed-effects
models that allow for heterogeneity among MSAs and/or time4
ΔPji;t ¼ γ j0 þ α j1ΔX i;t þ λ j1ΔP ji;t−1 þ λ j2 Pj*i;t−1−P ji;t−1
 
þ ϑi þ ε ji;t ð4:MSA FEÞ
3 Previous literature has considered related measures such as the percentage of land available for development
(see, e.g. Rose 1989 or Capozza and Seguin 1996).
4 As the housing supply elasticity is time-invariant for each metropolitan area, in the MSA-level fixed effect
regression specifications (4.MSA-FE) and (4.MSA&Time-FE) we exclude this variable from the vector of
fundatament factors. For notational convenience, we still use ΔXi, t to denote the relevant fundamental factors
in these two model specifications.
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ΔPji;t ¼ γ j0 þ α j1ΔX i;t þ λ j1ΔPji;t−1 þ λ j2 Pj*i;t−1−Pji;t−1
 
þ μt þ ε ji;t ð4:Time FEÞ
ΔP ji;t ¼ γ j0 þ α j1ΔX i;t þ λ j1ΔP ji;t−1 þ λ j2 P j*i;t−1−P ji;t−1
 
þ ϑi þ μt þ ε ji;t (4.MSA&Time-FE)
One difficulty with this estimation is that the fundamental values P j*i;t−1 depend
on the estimates of the different versions of eqs. (4) while at the same time
they are part of the error correction term which is used as an explanatory
variable in these equations. We resolve this issue using the iterative procedure
proposed by Abraham and Hendershott (1996). We assume that the observed
house price in December 1999 corresponds to its fundamental value (i.e. Pj*i;t
¼ Pji;t for t=December 1999) and recover the fundamental value time series
from the relationship P j*i;t ¼ Pj*i;t−1 þ ΔPj*i;t . We then re-estimate eqs. (4) and re-
calculate fundamental prices repeatedly until the estimates stabilize (typically
we need to perform up to five iterations).5
We then analyze how the current (and past) values of the mortgage default
risk index, MDRIi,t impacts the future values of the fundamental component P
j*
i;t
and the bubble component Bji;t ¼ P ji;t−Pj*i;t of local house prices as well as the
foreclosure rates HFi,t. Furthermore, we use the house price decomposition to
explore how changes in the fundamental P j*i;t and the bubble B
j
i;t components of
home values affect foreclosure rates HFi, t.
Data, Variable Construction, and Summary Statistics
The estimation of the fundamental house price model is based on a panel of
107 MSAs located in 29 U.S. states. A map with the location of these MSAs is
presented in Fig. 1. For each MSA we observe the monthly growth rate of
house prices and local fundamental factors. Further, in our analysis of the effect
of the mortgage default risk index on house prices and foreclosures, we include
additional variables that account for the mortgage market conditions in each
MSA.
All MSAs in the dataset are listed in Table 7 in the Appendix along with the
state in which they are located. The table also contains the classification of
states into the recourse and non-recourse categories depending on whether states
allow lenders to pursue a deficiency judgment against foreclosed borrowers (we
use the classification of Ghent and Kudlyak 2011). In this figure, the recourse
states are depicted in dark blue and the non-recourse states are represented in
light blue color.
5 The initial fundamental value time series P j*i;t are obtained by estimating equation (4) without the error
correction term.
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Local House Prices and Fundamental Factors
In this study, we use themonthly Zillow home value indices6 for the period fromApril 1996
to December 2016. These indices are constructed from deed records using a hedonic
methodology which accounts for individual attributes such as size and number of bedrooms
and bathrooms. Amajor challenge in the construction of home value indices is the changing
composition of the properties sold in different periods. Indices based on a repeat-sales
methodology – such as the S&P Case-Shiller index or the index of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency – account for this issue by using only properties that are sold more than
once. This methodology has limitations for smaller regions or smaller market segments
where the number of repeat sales is limited.7 Zillow, on the other hand, aggregates all
transactions to create valuations for all properties (Zestimates) based on their characteristics8
and uses the Zestimates to construct its regional price indices (see, e.g. Dorsey et al. 2010 for
a discussion of this approach).
As we are interested in the dynamics of different market segments, we use the top and the
bottom house price tiers in our analysis. The top tier index captures the median value of
homes within the 65th to 95th percentile range while the bottom tier index captures the
median value of homes within the 5th to 35th percentile range for eachMSA. The dynamics
of the top and the bottom price tiers for three of the MSAs in the dataset (San Diego,
Minneapolis, and Phoenix) are presented in Fig. 2 (Panels A and B). These three MSAs
represent a cyclical, a steady, and a bubble market, respectively (Mayer 2011).
Although there is a variation across regional housing market segments, on
average the indices peak in late 2006, and then decline and reach their lowest
values between 2009 and 2012. They recover thereafter by almost reaching
6 These data are obtained from https://www.zillow.com/research/data
7 Indeed, the S&P Case-Shiller index covers only 20 cities.
8 For more information on the Zillow methodology see https://www.zillow.com/research/zhvi-methodology/
Fig. 1 MSAs and states (recourse versus non-recourse). Notes: The red dots represent the locations of the
MSAs. The dark blue areas represent recourse states, while the light blue areas represent non-recourse states.
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their pre-crisis period values around 2016. In our analysis, we use the log
differences of the price indices (i.e., the continuously compounded returns) for
the two market segments.
a
b
Fig. 2 Dynamics of house price indices for selected MSAs. a Bottom-tier house price index (solid lines) and
fundamental price (dash lines). b Top-tier house price index (solid lines) and fundamental price (dash lines). c
Bubble component of the bottom-tier house price index. d Bubble component of the top-tier house price index.
Notes: San Diego, Minneapolis, and Phoenix represent examples of a cyclical, a steady, and a bubble market,
respectively, according to the classification of Mayer (2011). The bubble component is calculated as the
deviation from the fundamental house price, i.e. the difference between the logs of the house price index and
its fundamental component: Bji;t ¼ P ji;t−P j*i;t
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The fundamental variables used include the population, personal income per capita,
total non-farm employment, construction cost, a derived user cost of homeownership,
and the land supply elasticity index in the MSA. Descriptive statistics of these
variables, except for land supply elasticity which is time-invariant, along with unit root
tests are presented in Table 1.
The population and personal income data are collected from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. We use cubic spline interpolation (De Boor 1978) to derive monthly values
from the original annual observations. The total non-farm employment, available at the
state level, is collected fromDatastream and used for all metropolitan areas located in the
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houses under construction, which is available from the U.S. Census Bureau. As only the
national index is available in monthly frequency, the change in construction costs varies
over time but not across MSAs. As a measure of land supply elasticity of MSAs, we use
the land supply estimates derived by Saiz (2010).9
To facilitate comparison to previous research, we construct the user cost by the
method of Capozza et al. (2004) which accounts for mortgage rates, taxes, expected
appreciation as well as annual maintenance and depreciation of properties. That is, the
user cost is constructed by the formula
User cost ¼ Mortgage Rateþ Property Tax Rateð Þ
 1−Income Tax Rateð Þ−Inflationþ 0:03 ð5Þ
Here the “Mortgage Rate” is the 30-Year fixed-rate mortgage average in the United
States, collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The “Property Tax Rate,”
collected from Wallethub,10 is the effective real-estate state tax rate. The “Income tax
rate” is the sum of the average federal income tax rate and average state income tax
rate for the middle quintile of households. The federal income tax rate is collected
from the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center,11 while the state income tax rate is
collected from the National Bureau of Economic Research.12 For inflation, we use
the CPI provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The annual maintenance
and obsolescence of properties are set at 3% as indicated in eq. (5).
Mortgage Lending
To account for local mortgage market conditions we construct two variables from the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data13: the total amount of mortgage loans in
a given year in each MSA (Loan supply) and the percentage of loans that are subprime,
or higher-priced mortgage loans in each MSA (Subprime). Loans are categorized as
subprime following the classification of Mayer and Pence (2008) according to which a
mortgage is a subprime mortgage if its rate spread exceeds 3% for first-lien mortgages
and 5% for junior lien mortgages.14
9 As this elasticity measure has only limited coverage, we are left with only 93 MSAs in our sample. Another
way to account for differences across MSAs is to estimate a model with MSA-level fixed effects while leaving
out the supply elasticity as a regressor. In Table 2 we report results for both the OLS and the fixed effect
model, but use the estimates of the fixed effect model in the subsequent analysis because this model allows us
to use all 107 MSAs in our sample.
10 Property tax rates are collected from: https://wallethub.com/edu/states-with-the-highest-and-lowest-
property-taxes/11585/
11 The average federal income tax rate is downloaded from:
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-average-federal-tax-rates-all-households
12 The state income tax rate is downloaded from: http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-tax-rates/. We apply the
rates for a family income of $50,000.
13 The HMDA data contains over 80% of home loans and is the most comprehensive source of data on
mortgage loans (Avery et al. 2007).
14 The rate spread is the difference between the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) and a survey-based estimate of
APRs offered on prime mortgage loans of a comparable type utilizing the “Average Prime Offer Rates” fixed
table or adjustable table, action taken, amortization type, lock-in date, APR, fixed term (loan maturity) or
variable term (initial fixed-rate period), and reverse mortgage.
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Mortgage Default Risk
The Mortgage Default Risk Index (MDRI hereafter) of Chauvet et al. (2016) is
constructed from the Search Volume Index (SVI) data for terms such as “foreclosure
help” and “government mortgage help” in US states published by Google Trends.15
The MDRI is obtained from the UCLA ZIMAN Center for Real Estate.16 Zillow also
publishes a Homes Foreclosed index (HF hereafter) which gives the number of homes
foreclosed per 10,000 homes in metropolitan areas each month. As an illustration, in
Fig. 3 (see Panels A and B) we present the dynamics of the MDRI and HF in three of
the MSAs in our sample – San Diego, Minneapolis, and Phoenix. Both indicators start
to increase in early 2007 and reach their peak around 2008 in San Diego, and around
2009 in Minneapolis and Phoenix. The descriptive statistics of these variables are
presented in Table 1.
Results
We first explore how real house prices respond to changes in local fundamental
factors by estimating the models given in eq. (4). In particular, we consider
population, personal income, employment, as well as the variable we created
for the user cost, construction cost, and the land supply elasticity of the MSA
(cf. Capozza et al. 2004; Stevenson 2008). As a preliminary step, we perform
unit root tests on the tiered house price indices as well as the fundamental
variables (see the last two columns in Table 1). These variables are non-
stationary in levels and stationary in first differences. This points to the
inherent difficulties that would be present if we tried to directly use the levels
of these variables in our statistical analysis. Furthermore, it justifies our focus
on growth rates and the use of an error correction modeling approach.
Long-Run Equilibrium Relationship
The regression results of the error correction models specified in the four versions of
eq. (4) are presented in Table 2. They include OLS estimates as well as estimates of
fixed-effect models in which we control for MSA and time fixed effects.
The coefficient estimates for all fundamental variables have the anticipated sign and
are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. As expected, growth in population,
personal income, and employment have a positive impact on house prices. An increase
in user cost, a significant component of which constitutes the mortgage interest rate, is
associated with lower house price growth. Similarly, an increase in construction cost
15 For the construction of their monthly MDRI, Chauvet et al. (2016) used “foreclosure assistance+foreclosure help+
government assistance mortgage+home mortgage assistance+home mortgage help+housing assistance+mortgage
assistance program+mortgage assistance+mortgage foreclosure help+mortgage foreclosure+mortgage help” to obtain
the joint SVI.
16 As the city-level MDRI data is only available for 20 cities, we use the state-level MDRI data for all the
MSAs in our sample. The data on the MDRI indices are available at: https://github.com/ChandlerLutz/MDRI_
Data
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leads to an increase in home values. Further, the relationship between the land supply
index and house prices is negative, as had been found in previous literature. The error
correction term is significant indicating that both the top and the bottom house price tiers
adust to their long-run equilibrium values. Similarly, the autoregressive coefficient is
positive and statistically significant, indicating the presence of momentum in housing
returns for both house price tiers.
The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that bottom tier homes are more
sensitive to changes in population, employment, user cost, and construction cost
as well as exhibit a stronger momentum. We formally test whether the coeffi-
cients for the top tier and the bottom tier are significantly different from each other using
a
b
Fig. 3 Default risk indices.
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the OLS model specification (Model 1 in Table 2). In particular, we construct a dummy
variable “Toptier,” which takes on the value of one for the top tier and zero for the bottom
tier index. We include it as a regressor along with the interactions of this variable with the
fundamental variables. We estimate this regression using Abraham and Hendershott’s
(1996) iterative method described in the “Methodology” section by pooling the top tier
and bottom tier observations together. We find that only the coefficients for the interaction
variables (Toptier ∗ΔHouse Pricet− 1) and (Toptier ∗ΔConstruction cost) are significant.
They have a negative sign indicating starter homes exhibit a stronger momentum effect and
their response to construction cost is greater compared to trade-up homes.
The fundamental house price model allows us to disaggregate house price
indices into their fundamental and bubble components. Using the estimates of
Model 2 (Panel Fixed Effects) in Table 2, we calculate these two components
of house price and represent their dynamics for three of the MSAs, (San Diego,
Minneapolis, and Phoenix) in Fig. 2. In the following subsections, we analyze
whether the MDRI helps predict these components of house prices and whether
these components affect future foreclosures.
Effect of MDRI on House Prices
As a next step, we explore how household sentiment revealed by the mortgage
default risk index (MDRI) impacts house prices. To account for mortgage
market conditions, we add as regressors two variables that we constructed from
HMDA data: the total amount of mortgage lending in the previous year (Total
Loans), and the percentage of mortgage loans that are classified as subprime
(Subprime). The results are reported in Table 3.
We find that an increase in the MDRI index lowers house price growth in
the following three to 6 months. In the regression in which all lags are included
(see model 8), the coefficients for the lags between 3 and 6 months are
statistically significant and range between −0.00017 and − 0.0012. Further, as
anticipated we find that the amount of mortgage credit that flows into the area
serves to increase home values, while subprime lending in the previous year
dampens home values in the current year.
In the Appendix, we present regression results for the 2007–2012 and the
2013–2016 subsamples (see Table 8, Panel A and Panel B, respectively), and
we find that the predictive power of MDRI applies mostly for the first
subsample that includes the subprime mortgage crisis. In addition to considering
actual growth rates of the house price tiers, we also analyze the decomposition
of house prices into their fundamental and bubble components. We find that the
MDRI dampens both the fundamental component (see Table 9) and the bubble
component (see Table 10) of house prices.
The regression results also indicate that foreclosure legislation has a signif-
icant effect on home value appreciation rates. In particular, house price growth
is on average lower in the metropolitan areas located in recourse states where
lenders can pursue a deficiency judgment against borrowers. The coefficient for
the recourse dummy variable in Table 3 is statistically significant at conven-
tional levels and equals −0.0002 across all specifications. One possible expla-
nation is that buying a home with a mortgage is less attractive to borrowers in
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a recourse state where contracts are lacking the put option associated with
mortgage default.
Effect of MDRI on Foreclosure Rates
Ghent and Kudlyak (2011), Table 1 provide an overview of foreclosure legis-
lation across US states and present statistics of the timeline of different stages
in the foreclosure process in each state. If there are no delays, a non-contested
non-judicial foreclosure can take as little as 60 days, yet often the process takes
longer. Furthermore, foreclosures are followed by a redemption period with a
duration of another 6 months. It could only be speculated when delinquent
borrowers start searching online for help and how the intensity of their searches
varies over time. To allow for different timing of online search we explore
alternative specifications. In Table 4 we present results for search behavior with
lags between 1 and 6 months.
We find that an increase in the MDRI lowers foreclosures for horizons
between 2 and 6 months.17 These coefficients are statistically significant and
range between −0.0425 and − 0.1645 (see model 8). In Table 5 we aggregate
the Google searches for periods of 3 months and considers regressions with
lags of up to a year.
We find also for this setting that Google searches reduce foreclosures (the
coefficients for the lags between 1 and 3 months and lags between 9 and
12 months are statistically significant). As a robustness check, in Table 11
presented in the Appendix we consider the 2007–2012 and the 2013–2016
subsamples and largely find an inverse relationship between MDRI index and
future foreclosures.
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the MDRI index
captures learning effects. That is, by searching online some households may
access information that helps them avert foreclosure. Further, consistent with
the theory of strategic default, we find that foreclosure rates are lower in
recourse states. Similar findings are reported in the recent empirical literature
on the effect of recourse on default. For example, Ghent and Kudlyak (2011),
Table 3 report that the probability of default of loans made in recourse states
is on average 6.2% smaller (although their coefficient estimate is not
significant).
Effect of House Prices on Foreclosure Rates
In Table 6 we report results for several alternative specifications. We disaggregate
house prices to their fundamental and bubble components and study the contributing
effect of these two components on foreclosures.
17 While in the regression specification including only one lag the MDRI coefficient is positive, it is only
marginally significant. Notably, the coefficient for one lag is insignificant when more lags of the MDRI
variable are included in the regression. Furthermore, for the specifications including more than one lag, the
MDRI coefficient is negative and highly statistically significant.
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The finding that is robust across all specifications is that the foreclosures
respond to changes in fundamental values. A 1 % drop in fundamental home
values increases the log of the homes foreclosed by 1.2, i.e. leads to about 3.3
extra foreclosures in the following month for every 10,000 homes. The bubble
component, on the other hand, does not appear to have an impact on the
proportion of defaulting homeowners. We interpret this as further evidence
for strategic sophistication by homeowners. A shock to the fundamental com-
ponent of home values would have a long-term effect on future house prices
while a shock to the bubble component would disappear over time as home
values revert to their long-run equilibrium. Indeed, note that the speed of
adjustment coefficient in the fundamental equation reported in Table 2 is
significant and has the anticipated sign. We further examine strategic default
behavior by constructing a dummy variable for house price declines of more
than 5% in the past twelve months (PriceDecline>5%). We do not find evi-
dence that foreclosures are driven primarily by option-theoretic defaults: the
coefficients for both the Recourse dummy and the interaction term of the
Recourse dummy with the (PriceDecline>5%) dummy are not significant. These
findings correspond to results reported in the recent empirical literature
documenting the relative rarity of defaults due solely to strategic motives, and
the relative importance of affordability constraints. Bhutta et al. (2017) find that
homeowners do not walk away from their investments unless they are
Table 5 Predictive power of MDRI for the Homes Foreclosed (three-month lags)
Dependent Variable Homes Foreclosed (HF)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔMDRI1 − 3 −0.0616*** −0.0624*** −0.0621***
ΔMDRI4 − 6 0.0119 0.015 0.0089
ΔMDRI7 − 9 0.0167 0.0109
ΔMDRI10 − 12 −0.0434*** −0.0451***
ΔHPt − 1 −1.1262*** −1.1002*** −1.0922*** −1.1308*** −1.1166*** −1.1339***
HFt − 1 0.9730*** 0.9730*** 0.9730*** 0.9727*** 0.9730*** 0.9728***
ΔLoan supplyt − 12 0.0094*** 0.0093*** 0.0093*** 0.0095*** 0.0094*** 0.0096***
Subprimet − 12 −0.0500*** −0.0506*** −0.0506*** −0.0527*** −0.0497*** −0.0517***
Recourse −0.0093** −0.0101*** −0.0101*** −0.0097*** −0.0094** −0.0092**
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 19,148 19,148 19,148 19,148 19,148 19,148
Adjusted R-squared 0.9425 0.9425 0.9425 0.9425 0.9425 0.9425
The table presents regression estimates of the effect of the MDRI index on the log of Homes Foreclosed. The
MDRI is included with three-month lags (e.g. ΔMDRI1 − 3 is the change in the log the MDRI index for the
previous three months, etc.). Loan supplyt − 12 is the total supply of mortgage loans in the previous year in the
MSA (derived from HMDA data). Subprimet − 12 is the percentage of the total amount of mortgage loans in the
MSA that are subprime. The Recourse variable takes on the value of one, if the MSA is in a recourse state, and
zero otherwise. One, two, and three asterisks represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
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substantially more ‘underwater’ than option-theoretical models would predict,
while Gerardi et al. (2018) find that default is primarily driven by income
shocks rather than strategic motives. We further explore how foreclosures
respond to house price declines of more than 5% in the previous year and
find that the foreclosures increase more in the MSAs sustaining such declines.
There is no evidence of a differential impact of such declines in recourse and
non-recourse states. Furthermore, the effect on foreclosures is about the same
regardless of whether the decline has originated in the top tier or the bottom
tier of the local housing market.
Conclusion
As of 2020, Google commands more than 92% of the search engine market
share worldwide with an estimated number of approximately 2 trillion global
Table 6 Predictive power of house price declines for the Homes Foreclosed
Dependent Variable Homes Foreclosed (HF)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔFundamentalt − 1 −1.1965*** −1.1971*** −1.2142*** −1.2071***
Bubblet − 1 −0.0895** −0.0862* −0.0898** −0.0863*
HFt − 1 0.9704*** 0.9695*** 0.9703*** 0.9695***
ΔLoan supplyt − 12 −0.0480*** −0.0480*** −0.0479*** −0.0479***
Subprimet − 12 0.0090*** 0.0092*** 0.0089*** 0.0092***
Price Decline>5% 0.0146*** 0.0203*** 0.0128* 0.0192**
ΔMDRIt − 1 −0.017 −0.0159 −0.0171 −0.016
ΔMDRIt − 2 −0.1634*** −0.1622*** −0.1635*** −0.1622***
ΔMDRIt − 3 −0.1169*** −0.1157*** −0.1171*** −0.1158***
ΔMDRIt − 4 −0.0559*** −0.0549*** −0.0561*** −0.0550***
ΔMDRIt − 5 −0.0434** −0.0426** −0.0436** −0.0427**
ΔMDRIt − 6 −0.0987*** −0.0980*** −0.0989*** −0.0981***
Recourse −0.0024 −0.0024
Recourse * Price Decline>5% −0.0146 −0.0143
Toptier 0.0003 0.0004
Toptier * Price Decline>5% 0.0045 0.0026
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 19,148 19,148 19,148 19,148
Adjusted R-squared 0.9428 0.9428 0.9428 0.9428
The table presents regression estimates of the effect of house prices on foreclosures. Price Decline>5% takes
on the value of one if house prices in the MSA declined more than 5% in the last 12 months and zero
otherwise. The dummy variable Toptier equals one for the top-tier house prices, and zero for the bottom-tier
house prices. One, two, and three asterisks represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
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searches per year (www.hubspot.com). Extant research has established that
Google searches provide timely indicators for social and economic activity in
a variety of domains ranging from automotive sales to the spread of infections,
to asset returns in financial and housing markets. Da et al. (2011) find that
search volume data predict stock returns and conclude that “search data has the
potential to objectively and directly reveal to empiricists the underlying belief
of an entire population of households.” Chauvet et al. (2016) constructed a
mortgage default risk index from data on Google search volumes for keywords
such as “mortgage help” and “foreclosures assistance” and demonstrated that
this index has predictive power for the returns on housing and mortgage-related
assets.
In this paper, we analyze how this mortgage default risk index is related to
house prices and foreclosure rates in local housing markets. Using a long-run
equilibrium model, we disaggregate local house prices into their fundamental
and bubble components. We then explore how the mortgage default risk
index relates to future housing market outcomes such as house prices and
foreclosures. In line with previous literature, we find that an increase in the
mortgage default risk index leads to lower house price appreciation rates.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we also find that an increase in the mortgage
default risk index reduces the percentage of foreclosures for various time
horizons. One interpretation of these findings is that economic agents not
only reveal their sentiments through their search behavior but also collect and
process the information they access and as a consequence adapt their behav-
ior. That is, through online searches for “foreclosure help” and “mortgage
assistance” households can access relevant information that helps them avert
foreclosures.
We also report new results on the interaction between housing and mortgage
markets which suggest some degree of household strategic behavior. In partic-
ular, we find that declines in the fundamental component of house prices lead
to an increase in foreclosure rates while declines in the transitory component of
house prices have no statistically significant effect. Furthermore, foreclosures
tend to be higher in metropolitan areas situated in non-recourse states where
lenders cannot pursue a deficiency judgment against borrowers.
In addition to exploring its predictive properties, one can also use online
search data to empirically test economic models that incorporate the learning of
economic agents and view equilibria as the outcome of adaptive behavior. The
empirical assessment of such models is left for future research.
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Appendix
Table 7 MSAs and classification of states according to state foreclosure law
Metropolitan area State1 Abbreviation Recourse / Non-recourse
Akron Ohio OH Recourse
Albany New York NY Recourse
Allentown Pennsylvania PA Recourse
Atlantic City New Jersey NJ Recourse
Bakersfield California CA Non-Recourse
Baltimore Maryland MD Recourse
Bellingham Washington WA Non-Recourse
Bend Oregon OR Non-Recourse
Binghamton New York NY Recourse
Bloomington Illinois IL Recourse
Boulder Colorado CO Recourse
California-Lexington Park Maryland MD Recourse
Canton Ohio OH Recourse
Charlotte North Carolina NC Non-Recourse
Chico California CA Non-Recourse
Cincinnati Ohio OH Recourse
Cleveland Ohio OH Recourse
Colorado Springs Colorado CO Recourse
Columbia South Carolina SC Recourse
Columbus Ohio OH Recourse
Corvallis Oregon OR Non-Recourse
Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin Florida FL Recourse
Cumberland Maryland MD Recourse
Dallas-Fort Worth Texas TX Recourse
Dayton Ohio OH Recourse
Denver Colorado CO Recourse
Eugene Oregon OR Non-Recourse
Fayetteville North Carolina NC Non-Recourse
Flagstaff Arizona AZ Non-Recourse
Fort Collins Colorado CO Recourse
Fresno California CA Non-Recourse
Glens Falls New York NY Recourse
Grand Junction Colorado CO Recourse
Green Bay Wisconsin WI Non-Recourse
Greenville South Carolina SC Recourse
Hanford California CA Non-Recourse
Hartford Connecticut CT Recourse
Johnson City Tennessee TN Recourse
Knoxville Tennessee TN Recourse
Lafayette-West Lafayette Indiana IN Recourse
Google Search Queries, Foreclosures, and House Prices
Table 7 (continued)
Metropolitan area State1 Abbreviation Recourse / Non-recourse
Lancaster Pennsylvania PA Recourse
Las Vegas Nevada NV Recourse
Lincoln Nebraska NE Recourse
Little Rock Arkansas AR Recourse
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim California CA Non-Recourse
Madera California CA Non-Recourse
Madison Wisconsin WI Non-Recourse
Medford Oregon OR Non-Recourse
Memphis Tennessee TN Recourse
Merced California CA Non-Recourse
Merced California CA Non-Recourse
Milwaukee Wisconsin WI Non-Recourse
Minneapolis-St Paul Minnesota MN Non-Recourse
Mobile Alabama AL Recourse
Modesto California CA Non-Recourse
Morristown Tennessee TN Recourse
Napa California CA Non-Recourse
Nashville Tennessee TN Recourse
New Haven Connecticut CT Recourse
New London Connecticut CT Recourse
North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton Florida FL Recourse
Oklahoma City Oklahoma OK Recourse
Olympia Washington WA Non-Recourse
Philadelphia Pennsylvania PA Recourse
Phoenix Arizona AZ Non-Recourse
Pittsburgh Pennsylvania PA Recourse
Pittsfield Massachusetts MA Recourse
Portland Oregon OR Non-Recourse
Prescott Arizona AZ Non-Recourse
Providence Rhode Island RI Recourse
Pueblo Colorado CO Recourse
Raleigh North Carolina NC Non-Recourse
Redding California CA Non-Recourse
Reno Nevada NV Recourse
Richmond Virginia VA Recourse
Riverside California CA Non-Recourse
Sacramento California CA Non-Recourse
Salem Oregon OR Non-Recourse
Salinas California CA Non-Recourse
Salisbury Maryland MD Recourse
San Diego California CA Non-Recourse
San Francisco California CA Non-Recourse
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Table 7 (continued)
Metropolitan area State1 Abbreviation Recourse / Non-recourse
San Jose California CA Non-Recourse
San Luis Obispo California CA Non-Recourse
Santa Cruz California CA Non-Recourse
Santa Maria-Santa Barbara California CA Non-Recourse
Santa Rosa California CA Non-Recourse
Seattle Washington WA Non-Recourse
Spartanburg South Carolina SC Recourse
Spokane Washington WA Non-Recourse
Springfield Massachusetts MA Recourse
Springfield Ohio OH Recourse
Stamford Connecticut CT Recourse
State College Pennsylvania PA Recourse
Stockton California CA Non-Recourse
Toledo Ohio OH Recourse
Tucson Arizona AZ Non-Recourse
Urban Honolulu Hawaii HI Recourse
Utica New York NY Recourse
Vallejo California CA Non-Recourse
Ventura California CA Non-Recourse
Virginia Beach Virginia VA Recourse
Visalia California CA Non-Recourse
Worcester Massachusetts MA Recourse
Yakima Washington WA Non-Recourse
York Pennsylvania PA Recourse
Yuba City California CA Non-Recourse
Yuma Arizona AZ Non-Recourse
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